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PRENATAL INJURIES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE PRIOR TO
CONCEPTION: AN EXPANSION OF TORT LIABILITY
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital
67 I11. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977)
Few areas of tort law have undergone a more radical reversal of legal
reasoning than that of prenatal injury. This reversal is dramatically reflected
by the recent decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital.1 The court in Renslow resolved an issue of first impression
in Illinois when it permitted an action for prenatal injuries which resulted
from negligent conduct occuring prior to conception. 2 Judicial recognition
of the right to recover for prenatal injuries which result in injury or death to
the later-born infant is a recent development in tort law. Renslow broadened
this concept to include pre-conception injuries and thus marked an expansive advancement from prior historical restrictions.
At early common law, it was recognized that a prenatal injury afforded
no foundation for an action in damages. 3 The underlying rationale was that
the unborn child was not recognized as having an existence separate from its
mother. 4 This rule was strictly adhered to despite the fact that civil, ecclesiastical and admiralty courts frequently afforded the unborn child in
esse 5 status. 6 The rule forbidding prenatal recovery changed because of
developing scientific proof that a fetus has a separate existence in the
mother's womb. 7 However, consistent with the then popular view that an
unborn child's existence commenced with viability, 8 the right to recover
1. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
2. For purposes of this article, the term pre-conception refers to any time prior to
conception and the term prenatal refers to the time between conception and birth.
3. E.g., Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
4. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 I11.359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
5. In esse means "in being." A child after birth is in esse. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 894
(4th rev. ed. 1968).
6. 5B LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIALTIES §
37.29 (Rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA]. See also Note, The

Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349,
356 (1971); 21 VILL. L. REV. 994, 1000 (1975-1976).

7. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Note, Radiation and Preconception
Injuries: Some Interesting Problems in Tort Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 414, 431 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Radiation and Preconception Injuries].
8. Viability is the ability to live, grow, and develop; viable is capable of living, as a
newborn or a fetus which has reached a stage, usually twenty-eight weeks or older, which will
permit it to live outside the uterus. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY V-22 (13th ed.
1977) [hereinafter cited as TABER'S].
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was, for a time, limited to those who had matured to a viable stage at the
time of injury. 9 This restriction assured the courts that there was life in the
womb capable of existence independent of the mother.
In time the courts realized that the viability criterion was arbitrary and,
in an effort to provide more protection for the unborn child, began to
recognize liability even when the child had not attained viability status at the
time of the injury. 10 This recognition was prompted by an awareness that a
fetus is a separate entity and should therefore be afforded a legal status at
conception. Today, the majority of jurisdictions permit recovery for prenatal
injuries incurred at any stage of fetal development."l
The issue of recovery for prenatal injuries, in its brief existence, has
generated considerable controversy. Each case raises an assortment of
unique and difficult social and legal issues, such as the legal status to be
afforded a fetus,1 2 the reasonableness of recognizing a duty to a person not
yet in being, 13 the scope of protection to be afforded a potential child 4 and
the difficulties of proof and causation.I" The extension of liability to preconception negligence raises even more troublesome questions about what
kinds of injuries should be, and what kinds of injuries can be, equitably
redressed under our existing tort system. For this reason, Renslow, the first
The term viability was similiarly defined by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with
artificial aid." 410 U.S. at 160 (quoting L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS
493 (14th ed. 1971); DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1689 (24th ed. 1965)). The

Court noted that Viability usually occurs at about seven months, but may occur as early as 24
weeks. Roe, which held a Texas criminal abortion statute unconstitutional, noted that the state
has an important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. This
interest increases as the woman approaches term, and at the point the fetus reaches viability,
becomes compelling. The Court chose viability as the line of demarcation because at that point
the fetus has the capability of meaningful life outside the womb. The Court concluded that
when a fetus reaches viability, the state may prohibit the mother from obtaining an abortion,
except when necessary to protect the life or health of the mother.
9. E.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Amann v. Faidy, 415 II1.422,
114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
10. E.g., Sana v. Brown, 35 111. App. 2d 425, 183 N.E.2d 187(1962); Daley v. Meier, 33 111.
App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Sinkler
v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960).
11. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956) (mother
approximately six weeks pregnant); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951);
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,157 A.2d 497(1960); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483,147 A.2d
108 (1958); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (mother one month pregnant);
Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966); Daley v. Meier, 33 I11.App. 2d 218, 178
N.E.2d 691 (1961) (mother approximately one month pregnant); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App.
Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953) (third month of pregnancy).
12. See, e.g., 21 VILL. L. REV. 994, 1001 (1975-1976).
13. E.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 II1. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
14. E.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 II. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
15. E.g., Amann v. Faidy, 415 II1. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J.
303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964).
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case in Illinois to allow an action for pre-conception negligence, commands
the detailed scrutiny of any attorney practicing in this area of the law. Its
significance, however, does not end there. Additionally, Renslow represents the first time that the Illinois Supreme Court has passed on the question
of a right of action for injuries sustained in utero during a previable stage of
development.
This comment will assess the reasoning of the court's holding in
Rerslow. Toward that end, it is necessary to review the cases in Illinois and
other jurisdictions which established prenatal injury law. Related topics that
will be discussed include viability, the concept of liability premised upon
duty and the significance of the elements of foreseeability and causation.
Finally, the problems presented by Renslow and the merits of the decision
will be explored.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF RENSLOW

Emma Renslow, individually and on behalf of her minor daughter,
Leah Ann, brought an action in negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct against the Mennonite Hospital and its Director of Laboratories. Damages were sought for personal injuries sustained by Leah Ann while a fetus.
At first glance, the facts in Renslow seem to be indistinguishable from those
in earlier prenatal cases. However, peculiar to Renslow was the fact that
Leah Ann's injuries were the result of negligent acts committed against her
mother many years before Leah Ann was conceived.
The complaint alleged that in October of 1965, when Emma Renslow
was thirteen years of age, she was admitted to the defendant hospital. At that
time, the defendant doctor was in charge of the defendant hospital's laboratory division. Twice during her treatment, Emma was transfused with Rhpositive blood. Her Rh-negative blood was not compatible with, and was
sensitized1 6 by, the Rh-positive blood. It was not until December of 1973,
when she underwent a routine blood test after becoming pregnant, that
Emma Renslow became aware of an adverse reaction caused by the transfusions. The sensitization of her blood ultimately resulted in prenatal damage
to Leah Ann's hemolytic 17 processes. By necessity, delivery was prematurely induced. Leah Ann was born on March 5, 1974, jaundiced 8 and
16. The term sensitized means made susceptible to a specific substance. TABER'S, supra
note 8, at S-33.
17. The term hemolytic pertains to the breaking down of red blood cells. TABER'S, supra
note 8, at H-29.
18. "Jaundice is a condition characterized by yellowness of skin, whiteness of eyes,
mucous membranes, and body fluids, due to deposition of bile pigment resulting from excess
bilirubin (hyperbilirubinemia) in the blood. It may be caused by obstruction of bile passageways, excess destruction of red blood cells (hemolysis), or disturbances in functioning of liver
cells." TABER'S, supra note 8, at J-1.
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suffering from hyperbilirubinemia. 19 Her life was in grave danger. Immediately after birth, she required one complete exchange transfusion of her
blood and another shortly thereafter. It was alleged that Leah Ann's nervous
system and various other organs were permanently damaged.
The portion of the complaint which sought damages for Leah Ann's
injuries was dismissed at the trial stage. The trial court decided, as a matter
of law, that there was no actionable tort because Leah Ann was not
conceived at the time of the negligent acts. The Fourth District Appellate
Court reversed, finding "no logical reason to deny recovery to a person
simply because he had not been conceived when the wrongful conduct took
place." 2" The appellate court noted that although the tortious act occurred
before Leah Ann's conception, she was not injured until after conception.
When viewed in this perspective, Renslow was merely another action for
prenatal personal injuries, distinguishable only by the fact that the injuries
was not enough to
were caused by pre-conception conduct. This distinction
21
convince the court to bar the plaintiff's action.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. The sole question
presented was whether a child, not conceived at the time negligent acts were
committed against its mother, had an action against the tortfeasors for its
injuries resulting from their misconduct.
PRIOR CASE LAW

PrenatalInjury Cases
The first case in the United States to discuss recovery for prenatal
injuries was the landmark case of Dietrich v. Inhabitantsof Northampton,22
decided in 1884 by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. The
Dietrich court dismissed an action for the wrongful death of a nonviable
fetus which had died after a premature birth. 23 The decision rested on the
19. The term hyperbilirubinemia refers to an excessive amount of bilirubin in the blood.
TABER'S, supra note 8, at H-69. Bilirubin is the orange-colored or yellowish pigment in bile
which is carried to the liver by the blood. It is produced from hemoglobin of red blood cells in
the bone marrow, in the spleen and elsewhere. It is changed chemically in the liver, and finally
excreted. TABER'S, supra note 8, at B-27.
20. 40 Il. App. 3d 234, 240, 351 N.E.2d 870, 874 (1976).
21. Id. at 239, 351 N.E.2d at 874.
22. 138 Mass. 14 (1884). In Dietrich, the plaintiff, who was four or five months pregnant,
slipped and fell on a negligently maintained roadbed. As a result, she suffered a miscarriage.
There was evidence that the child lived for ten to fifteen minutes after the miscarriage. Id. at
14-15.
23. Since Dietrich involved injury to a non-viable fetus, it was not the most opportune
case in which to introduce recovery for prenatal injuries to the law of torts. The Dietrich court
,was, in all likelihood, hesitant to create a duty to an unborn child because of the absence of a
developed medical science at that time. Comment, Negligence and the Unborn Child: A Time
for Change, 18 S.D.L. REV. 204, 206 (1973) [hereinafter cited as A Time for Change].
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absence of precedent24 and the then-popular concepts that a child could not
survive outside its mother's womb before birth and that a child had no
legally recognizable existence separate from its mother upon which to
predicate a duty. Damage to the unborn child, said the court, "which was
not too remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by [the mother]. "25
Dietrich provided the precedent and reasoning which was to be followed for
years.26
Dietrich was adopted as dispositive in 1900 by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital,27 which denied recovery to a
plaintiff who, at the time of injury, was a viable fetus.2 8 The rationale of the
court's holding was that the defendant owed no independent duty to the
child because "a child before birth is, in fact, a part of the mother and is
3°
only severed from her at birth. "29 Justice Boggs, whose vigorous dissent
was relied upon in subsequent cases allowing recovery for prenatal injuries,
questioned whether it was "sacrificing truth to a mere theoretical abstraction
to say the injury was not to the child but wholly to the mother" 31 when the
fetus was independently viable at the time of the injury. 32 Medical science
has demonstrated, said Justice Boggs, that
[A]t a period of gestation in advance of the period of parturition the foetus is capable of independent and separate life, and
24. The court in Dietrich commented: "But no case, so far as we know, has ever decided
that, if the infant survived, it could maintain an action for injuries received by it while in its
mother's womb." 138 Mass. at 15.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Cases relying on Dietrich were: Stanford v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 618, 108 So.
566 (1926); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 11. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Buel v. United Rys.,
248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942);
Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567(1931); Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16
A.2d 28 (1940); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 A. 704 (1901); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling
Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935); Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co.,
164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916). In a few cases, recovery was barred on the theory that there
was no contract and therefore no duty was owed. Nugent v. Brooklyn Hts. Ry., 154 App. Div.
667, 139 N.Y.S. 367 (1913); Walker v. Great N. Ry., 28 L.R. Jr. 69 (1890). In Walker, the
defendant-carrier had contracted to carry the plaintiff's mother. The court denied recovery to
plaintiff in a personal injury action, holding that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff
while she was in her mother's womb because the defendant had no knowledge as to the
plaintiff's presence.
27. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). In Allaire, the expectant mother, nine months
pregnant, boarded an elevator within the defendant hospital and was injured therein. Her later
born child sued for his prenatal injuries.
28. The cases adopting Dietrich, including Allaire, disregarded the fact that the communication of a shock to the mother in Dietrich was the sole injury to the infant. See LAWYER'S
MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 6.
29. 184 11. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640.
30. Mr. Justice Boggs distinguished Allaire from Dietrich on the basis that the unborn
child in Dietrich had not attained a state of viability whereas the unborn child in Allaire was
viable when injured. Id. at 372-73, 56 N.E. at 642 (Boggs, J., dissenting). This is a distinction
frequently drawn.
31. Id. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641.
32. Id.
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that though within the body of the mother, it is not merely a part of

her body, for her body may die in all its parts and the child remain
alive and capable of maintaining life when separated from the
dead body of the mother.33
The dissent of Justice Boggs thus became the first inroad into the doctrine
precluding recovery for prenatal injuries.
Despite the eloquent dissent of Justice Boggs, Dietrich and Allaire
reflected the status of judicial thought in the United States over the next
forty-six years. While courts occasionally disagreed with this view, and
many judges dissented from opinions upholding it, it was not until 1946 that
changes occurred.' 4 A rapid series of cases, commencing with Bonbrest v.
Kotz, 35 brought about what has been termed the most abrupt reversal ever to
take place in the law of torts.36 Bonbrest, decided by the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, initiated the shift by departing
from Dietrich and becoming the first case to recognize a common law action
for prenatal injuries 37 Bonbrest is particularly significant because it established viability as the minimum liability standard.38 It quoted with approval
the following observation of the Supreme Court of Canada 39 in a factually
similar case:
If a child after birth has no right of action for prenatal injuries, we have a wrong inflicted for which there is no remedy
. . . for.

.

.

there is a residuum of injury for which compensation

cannot be had save at the suit of the child. If a right of action be
33. Id. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641. Mr. Justice Boggs further stated:
The law should, it seems to me, be, that whenever a child in utero is so far advanced in
pre-natal age as that, should parturition by natural or artificial means occur at such
age, such child could and would live separable from the mother and grow into the
ordinary activities of life, and is afterwards born and becomes a living human being,
such child has a right of action for any injuries wantonly or negligently inflicted upon
his or her person at such age of viability, though then in the womb of the mother. That
proposition having been established, that an adjustment of damages with the mother
could not preclude the child would naturally and necessarily follow.
Id. at 374, 56 N.E. at 642.
34. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
35. Id. Bonbrest was followed by: Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208
Ga. 201, 65 S.W.2d 909 (1951); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951);
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92
N.E.2d 809 (1950); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334
(1949).
36. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER];
A Time for Change, supra note 23, at 209.
37. The Bonbrest court distinguished Dietrich as follows: "[H]ere we have not, as in the
Dietrich case, 'an injury transmitted from the actor to a person through his. . . mother before
he became a person' . . . but a direct injury to a viable child .... " 65 F. Supp. at 140.
38. Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46
NOTRE DAME LAW. 349, 356 (1971). Although Bonbrest limited its holding to injuries sustained
by a viable fetus, it noted, rather significantly, that "apart from viability, a non-viable fetus is
not a part of its mother." 65 F. Supp. at 140.
39. Montreal Tramways v. LeVeille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337.
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denied to the child it will be compelled, without any fault on its
part, to go through life carrying the seal of another's fault. ....
40
In allowing recovery for personal injuries sustained by a surviving infant
injured during delivery, the court recognized that an infant has a legal
existence separate from its mother at such time as it is capable of independently sustaining its life. 4 1
The turnabout started by Bonbrest in other jurisdictions was paralleled
in Illinois. In 1953, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Amann v. Faidy,42 added
impetus to the Bonbrest doctrine by recognizing an action for prenatal
injuries to a fetus.43 However, as in Bonbrest, recovery was predicated on
the existence of viability at the time of injury. The court overruled Allaire
and allowed an action for the wrongful death of a child who was injured
while a viable fetus and who died after birth as a result of the injury. In
support of its decision, the court dismissed each of the grounds traditionally
urged in support of the rule denying a viable child an action for prenatal
injuries. These grounds include: (1) the absence of precedent; (2) the
difficulty of establishing a causal relation between a prenatal injury and the
condition of the child and the possibility of fictitious claims therefrom; and
(3) the lack of a duty to the unborn child because it has no separate being
apart from its mother."
With respect to the lack of common law precedent, the court stated that
40. Id. at 345. In Montreal Tramways, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a child was
entitled to recover for prenatal injuries, rejecting the defenses: (1) that a child was not in esse at
the time of the accident, but was a part of the mother; and (2) that a contractual obligation with
the child was absent. This case was actually the first to break away from Dietrich and allow an
action for prenatal injuries. Bonbrest, however, was the first in the United States to sustain a
prenatal injury action. Prior to Bonbrest, the Pennsylvania decision of Kine v. Zuckerman, 4
Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924), acknowledged recovery. This decision was, however, overruled by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940).
41. -[A] viable child . . .while dependent for its continued development on sustenance
derived from its peculiar relationship to its mother, is not a 'part' of the mother in the sense of a
constituent element . . . .Modern medicine is replete with cases of living children being taken
from dead mothers." 65 F. Supp. at 140.
42. 415 III. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
43. The first state supreme court to permit a viable child to recover was the Ohio Supreme
Court in Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949). Other
jurisdictions shortly followed the lead of Bonbrest by recognizing the capacity of the infant to
sue for prenatal injuries. In fact, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in effect,
overruled its holding in Dietrich in Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165
N.E.2d 912 (1960), when it said:
We think it advisable that in respect to the subject of prenatal injury the law of
this Commonwealth should be in general in harmony with that of the large and growing
proportion of the other States which have adopted in principle the rule proposed by
Judge Boggs. There is no need to reverse the Dietrich decision which doubtless was
right when rendered but we recognize that in view of modern precedent its application
should be limited to cases where the facts are essentially the same.
340 Mass. at 637, 165 N.E.2d at 415. See also LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 6, at
§ 37.30.
44. 415 I1. at 428, 114 N.E.2d at 415.
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nothing in the common law denied such a right to injured children. To the
contrary, the court noted that a child can "have a legacy, can own an estate,
and a guardian can be assigned to it." 4 5 The court further observed that an
unborn child is recognized by criminal and admiralty law. 46 Thus, the court
concluded that the processes of the law do not withhold from a child the
right to protect and preserve its person and property.
In response to the argument that it was difficult to prove a causal
relation between the injury and the damage, the Amann court recalled the
observation of a California appellate court in Scott v. McPheeters47 that
"[t]he difficulty of obtaining proof of the wrong should prompt greater
leniency in affording the remedy, rather than a denial of plain justice."'48
The court observed that physicians of today would have little trouble with
the problem of proof even though the problem might have been insurmountable long ago and that the fear of fraudulent claims should have no bearing
on whether legitimate claims are heard.
The third ground upon which recovery has been denied, the identity of
mother and child, was likewise rejected by the Amann court. In support of
its position, the court cited medical authorities on the proposition that an
infant, while unborn, reaches a stage during gestation where it can live
outside of its mother. In light of these "outmoded timeworn fictions," 49 the
court granted to the plaintiff an action against the defendant hospital.
Following Amann, the Illinois Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. Patti50
extended an action for prenatal personal injuries to an infant who was
injured while a viable fetus and who survived. The court found the holding
of Amann to be decisive of the legal issues before it.
Then, eight years later, the Appellate Court for the First District went
one step further and, in two decisions51 allowed liability to attach for
previable injuries. In Daley v. Meier, 52 the court permitted an infant, who
survived after sustaining injuries when his mother was approximately two
45. Id. at 429, 114 N.E.2d at 416 (quoting with approval the Supreme Court of Georgia in
Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, -, 65 S.E.2d 909, 910 (1951)).
46. 415 Ill. at 429-30, 114 N.E.2d at 416.
47. 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
48. Id. at 637, 92 P.2d at 682.
49. 415 II1. at 432, 114 N.E.2d at 417 (quoting with approval from Woods v. Lancet, 303
N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951)).
50. 415 111. 496, 114 N.E.2d 721.
51. Sana v. Brown, 35 I11.App. 2d 425,183 N.E.2d 187 (1962); Daley v. Meier, 33 I11.App.
2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961). Daley and Sana permitted the respective plaintiffs to maintain
actions, recognizing that an infant has a legal existence during its entire prenatal life. Although
none of these opinions considered the issue before the Renslow court, each implicitly recognized that the plaintiff must be in existence at the time of the tortious conduct, to maintain an
action. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 III. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d
1250 (1977).
52. 33 I11.App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961).
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months pregnant, to maintain an action for prenatal injuries. In so holding,
the court recognized that an action for prenatal injuries is not dependent
upon viability. Even though Amann 53 employed the viability standard,
Daley relied on the overall reasoning and tenor of that decision. 54 In
particular, Daley relied on the statements in Amann that lack of precedent
should not bar recovery where a wrong has been committed, proof of a
causal relation between the injury en ventre sa mere56 and subsequent
damage is no longer as speculative 57 and the reasons which have been
advanced in support of nonliability are insubstantial. 5"
The identical question formulated in Daley was raised in Sana v.
Brown .59 In Sana, the plaintiff was born four and one-half months after an
automobile accident in which her mother sustained injuries. The defendant
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as to the plaintiff-child on the ground
that she was not viable at the time of the injury. The appellate court found
Daley to be controlling on the issue that an action for prenatal injuries is not
dependent on viability and remanded with directions to overrule defendant's
60
motion to dismiss.
Finally, in Chrisafogeorgisv. Brandenberg,61prenatal injury recovery
was broadened by the Illinois Supreme Court to permit a wrongful death
action on behalf of a child who was injured while viable and thereafter born
dead. The only fact in Chrisafogeorgis which was different from Amann
was the time of death. In Amann, the child died after delivery while in
Chrisafogeorgisthe child was stillborn. The character of injury, however,
was identical because the child in each case was injured while viable. The
court noted that the basic question in both cases was the legal significance of
viability. Therefore, the court found in Chrisafogeorgis, that it was a
natural development from the Amann holding to allow an action for injuries
sustained by a viable fetus who was stillborn. By 1973, the barriers to a right
53. 415 111.422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
54. 33 111.App. 2d at 223, 178 N.E.2d at 694.
55. Id.
56. En ventre sa mere is .i term meaning "in its mother's womb." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
57. 415 Ill. at 430, 114 N.E.2d at 417.
58. Id. at 432, 114 N.E.2d at 417.
59. 35 II1. App. 2d 425, 183 N.E.2d 187 (1962).
60. Id. at 426, 183 N.E.2d at 187. In only two cases, Rapp v. Hiemenz, 107 I11.App. 2d
382, 246 N.E.2d 77 (1969), and Green v. Smith, 51111. App. 3d 856, 366 N.E. 2d 961 (1977), have
Illinois courts recently denied prenatal actions. The facts in Rapp and Green are, however, as
recognized by the courts, markedly different from those in Daley. In Rapp and Green, the
injuries were inflicted at a time when the fetuses were nonviable and thereafter, the children
were born dead. In contrast, although the child in Daley was injured while in a previable stage
of development, it was born alive. At no time was there a viable fetus in Rapp or Green capable
of independent existence. Id. at 387, 246 N.E.2d at 79.
61. 55 111.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
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injuries had been irrevocably penetrated throughout
of action for prenatal
62
the United States.
Pre-Conception Cases
Throughout the history of prenatal injury actions at common law, the
lack of a person in existence to whom a duty of care could be owed has often
troubled the courts. 63 Few jurisdictions have been confronted with cases
involving pre-conception tortious conduct. However, those which have
faced this problem have concluded that the plaintiff need not be in existence
at the time of the negligent conduct in order to recover.
In Piper v. Hoard,64 the New York Court of Appeals recognized a right
of action for nonphysical pre-conception tortious conduct. Piper involved a
suit for financial damage suffered by the plaintiff-child as a result of a fraud
perpetrated on her mother before the plaintiff's conception. The court
allowed the action, reasoning that the plaintiff was the person harmed by the
fraud even though she was not born when the fraud was committed. Even
though the plaintiff, individually, was not in the mind of the defendant when
he perpetrated the fraud, she belonged to the class of persons contemplated
65
by the defendant when he made his misrepresentations.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Jorgenson
v. Meade Johnson Laboratories,66 allowed an action to be maintained by
surviving children even though the negligent act causing their injuries
occurred prior to conception. The father brought suit against a pharmaceutical company seeking to hold it liable for the creation of a mongoloid
condition in his twin daughters. The complaint averred that the mother of
the twins used birth control pills manufactured by the defendant company
62. See Comment, Wrongful Birth, The Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J.
140, 141 n.5 (1976).
63. James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 778, 788 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as James]; see also Comment, Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital: Prenatal
Injuries and a Pre-Existence Duty, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 417, 420 (1977).
64. 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887).
65. The court said:
It is true the plaintiff was not born when the fraudulent representations were made.
Still they were made by defendant to the plaintiff's mother for the purpose of inducing
a marriage between the parents, and if they had been true, the plaintiff would have
been the owner of this particular property. In this way she is the very person injured
by the fraud, and although not individually in the mind of the defendant when he
perp :trated that fraud, yet, as filling the position of heir to her father, she belongs to
the class which defendant had in contemplation when he represented to the mother
that the heir of Frederick would have the farm. In this way it may be claimed that
defendant had in view the plaintiff and the rights he alleged she would have.
107 N.Y. at 79-80, 13 N.E. at 630.
66. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973). Although the Renslow appellate court decision relied on
Jorgensen to support its holding, the Illinois Supreme Court disregarded Jorgensen, saying that
the decision focused on causation in permitting a cause of action for pre-conception tortious
conduct. 67 111.2d at 356, 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
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and became pregnant after she ceased taking the pills. The pills allegedly
altered the mother's chromosome structure, thus creating a mongoloid
deformity in the viable fetus. The court, although recognizing that the
pleadings could not be interpreted as being limited to pre-conception developments, 67 indicated that tortious conduct occurring prior to conception is
actionable on behalf of an infant ultimately injured by the wrong. The court
observed that "[i]f the view prevailed that tortious conduct occurring prior
to conception is not actionable in behalf of an infant ultimately injured by
the wrong, then an infant suffering personal injury from a defective food
product, manufactured before his conception, would be without a reme68
dy."
An action was brought in a New York court by the parents on behalf of
the estate of their minor daughter in Parkv. Chessin .69 The central issue was
whether there exists after birth a right to make claim for pain and suffering
resulting from a tort committed prior to conception. The complaint claimed
that the mother of the deceased plaintiff gave birth to a child in June of
1969. The child was born with polycystic7 ° kidneys and died shortly thereafter. The defendant doctor advised the mother that she could safely become
pregnant again. Upon so doing, she gave birth to a second child who
suffered from polycystic kidneys, which resulted in the child's death. The
estate of this infant-decedent sought damages for the pain suffered by her
after her birth based upon the tort committed prior to conception. The court
upheld the right to bring the action because the second infant child was a
"potential being with essential reality at the time of the act." ' 71 The court
noted that:
Once having been born alive, particularly where, as here, the child
was foreseeable and within the contemplation of the defendants,
where defendants are claimed to have been aware of or should
67. The court explained:
However, in giving the complaint the favorable consideration required we must weigh
with the remainder of the complaint the allegations that 'a Mongoloid deformity was
created within the viable fetus of the minor plaintiffs during the period of development
prior to birth . . .'and that the '. . . viable fetus of the minor plaintiffs were exposed
to the altered chromosome structure within the mother's body . . . .' Thus the
pleading should not be construed as being limited to effects or developments before
conception.
483 F.2d at 239.
68. Id. at 240.
69. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976).
70. Composed of many cysts. TABER'S, supra note 8, at P- 113.
71. The court said:
Since the decedent's conception took place after the alleged tort committed by defendants, and since the child was a potential being with essential reality at the time of the
act, for she belonged to a class which defendants could foresee and had in contemplation when they made the alleged misrepresentation to the mother and committed the
alleged tort, defendants had in view the decedent. In this way, according to Piper, it

can be claimed there was a "foreseeability".
88 Misc. 2d at 227, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
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have been aware of the danger that said child might or would be
born with such defects, and malady, said child assuredly comes
within the 7"orbit
of the danger" for which defendants could be
2
held liable.
The defendants, said the court, being members of the medical profession,
are not "unreasonably burdened if held liable in damages for the injuries
caused to those who depend on it for their very lives . . .,73
No Illinois court prior to June 10, 1976, when the appellate court
opinion in Renslow was decided, had been confronted with a case involving
an injury occasioned by negligent conduct prior to conception. In fact, the
Illinois prenatal decisions had, until that time, restricted recovery to "per74
sons" who were, at the very least, already conceived at the time of injury.
After Daley and Sana abandoned viability as a requirement, the Illinois
decisions had a twofold concern with whether the injured fetus survived and
if it did not, whether it was viable when injured. Among the principal
reasons advanced for allowing an action for a prenatal injury was the
recognition that a fetus has an existence independent of its mother and is
thus capable of sustaining injury.
This restriction of recovery to fetuses might lead one to conclude that
under Illinois law only "persons" can be injured and that a fetus becomes a
person capable of sustaining injury only if the injury occurs during gestation. It is true that each case in Illinois has at least implicitly recognized that
a person must be in existence at the time of the negligent conduct to
maintain an action. However, this is because no Illinois court had the
occasion .to consider a pre-conception injury case prior to Renslow.
One Illinois case did, however, allude to the possibility of recovery for
pre-conception negligent conduct. In Zepeda v. Zepeda ,'75 a case often
described as one for "wrongful life," an action was brought by an illegitimate child against his natural father. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
fraudulently induced the plaintiff's mother to have sexual relations with him
by promising to marry her. When the defendant did not marry plaintiff's
mother, plaintiff was born a bastard. The issue before the court was whether
a tort can be inflicted simultaneously with conception. The court indicated
that this issue seemed to be the natural result of the course of recent law
72. Id. at 230, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
73. Id. at 231, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 211. "Specializing physicians owe a degree of care to their
patients greater than the ordinary general practitioner . . . .Unlike other professions, the
medical profession deals not with money or property but with the continuance of life and
avoidance of death ....
" Id.
74. Brief for Appellant at 6, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67111. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250
(1977).
75. 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
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which had been allowing actions for injury closer and closer to the moment
of conception.
In reference to the possibility of allowing recovery for pre-conception
negligent conduct, the appellate court remarked:
But what if the wrongful conduct takes place before conception?
Can the defendant be held accountable if his act was completed
before the plaintiff was conceived? Yes, for it is possible to incur,
'a conditional prospective liability in tort to one not yet in
being.' It makes no difference how much time elapses between a
wrongful act and
76 a resulting injury if there is a causal relation
between them.
The court concluded that it was not important whether the plaintiff's life
began during or after the negligent conduct. The plaintiff, said the court,
cannot be viewed as a "person" in the traditional sense of the word. What is
significant is that the plaintiff "is a person now and he was a potential
person" 77 capable of existing independently at the time of the negligent act.
Although the Zepeda court labeled the wrong committed by the defendant a tort, it concluded that any such creation of a new tort should be
undertaken by the legislature because of the potentially far-reaching effects
of such a decision. The court's reason for deferring to the legislature was not
that the establishment of a cause of action alleging pre-conception misconduct should lie only with the legislature; rather, the court was concerned
with the flood of litigation threatened by the establishment of such a cause of
action.
RENSLOW V. MENNONITE HOSPITAL

The main concern of the Renslow court was whether there was a duty
owed to this plaintiff by the defendant. In addressing this issue, the court
considered several elements which historically have been necessary to the
imposition of a duty in negligence actions: namely, whether the plaintiff
falls within the class of persons to whom the defendant owes a duty, 78
whether the consequences of the defendant's conduct were foreseeable, 79
and whether this was an interest to which the law desired to extend protection.8 0
The Illinois Supreme Court had not, until Renslow, confronted the
question of the existence of the right of action for injuries sustained in utero
during previable fetal development. The complaint in Renslow contained no
76. Id. at 250, 190 N.E.2d at 853.
77. Id. at 253, 190 N.E.2d at 855.
78. See PROSSER, supra note 36, at § 53.
79. Id. at § 43.
80. See PROSSER, supra note 36, at §§ 54 & 56.
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allegations that viability had been realized when the injuries were sustained.
Thus, before it could be determined whether the plaintiff fell within the class
of persons threatened by the defendant's conduct, thereby imposing a duty
on the plaintiff, the court had to decide whether the right to sue should turn
on the viability of the fetus at the time of injury.
PracticalDifficulties in Determining Viability
In deciding whether viability should be a prerequisite to an action for
personal injuries, the Renslow court analyzed two crucial factors: (1) the
uncertainties and practical difficulties of devising a satisfactory viability
standard; and (2) precedents rejecting viability as the determinant of liability.
Courts and commentators 8 ' alike have for years recognized the practical difficulties of determining when independent life begins in the fetus.
Even though the point at which a fetus is capable of surviving apart from its
mother has receded due to developments in medical technology, proof of
viability is not much easier today than it was years ago. There is no effective
way to determine in a borderline case whether a fetus was viable at the
moment of injury. 82 It has been said that viability is not determined solely by
the age of the fetus;83 it is rather dependent upon numerous variables such as
the age and health of the expectant mother. 84 Because there is no clear line
of demarcation, courts have often been forced to decide arbitrarily whether a
fetus was capable of independent life at the time of injury.8 5 Since the
viability limitation is not practical as a test of recovery, 86 the age of the fetus
at the time of injury should not be controlling in establishing liability.
The inequities and inconsistencies of the viability standard also have
raised serious doubts about its fairness.87 Most significantly, the viability
81. See notes 82-86 and accompanying text, supra.
82. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); A Time for Change, supra note
23, at 215.
83. See, e.g., A ime for Change, supra note 23, at 215 (1973).
84. See 21 VILL. L. REV. 994 (1975-1976); PROSSER, supra note 36, at § 55.
85. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); A Time for Change, supra note
23, at 215.
86. Cf. LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 6, § 37.31 (serious doubt as to
whether age of fetus should be controlling).
87. The court in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 stated:
In the last few years a change has taken place in the law pertaining to prenatal physical
injuries. . . . judges were troubled by the unfairness of holding that a child en ventre
sa mere was a human being for inheritance and property rights and not one if it
suffered tortious physical injury . . . . Gradually thereafter various jurisdictions
permitted actions for prenatal injuries if a child was viable at the time of injury and if it
survived birth . . . . but generally the viability of the child at the time of injury
became the criterion upon which recovery rested . . . . The law has slowly come to
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criterion has been seen as bearing no relevance to the harm which results
from the wrongful prenatal conduct of another.88 Whether the child is viable
at the time of injury or not, he or she frequently sustains the identical harm
after birth and thus, should be given the same opportunity for redress. 89 The
primary reason for allowing prenatal recovery, the injustice of denying
recovery, applies to tortious conduct to a child be he a fetus of three months
or eight months at the time of injury. 90 The viability rule limits recovery to
viable fetuses for the same reason that Dietrich denied all recovery, that is,
because no duty of care is owed to an unborn child. 9 1 Hence, the same
criticisms which led to the demise of Dietrich can be used to rebut the
viability doctrine.92
The court in Renslow recognized these problems and concluded that
the degree of maturity reached by the child at the time of injury should not
be the decisive criterion for recovery. The court noted that viability is a
"most unsatisfactory criterion since [viability] is a relative matter, depending on the health of mother and child and many other matters in addition to
the stage of development." 93 Along with the length of pregnancy, said the
court, viability depends on other factors such as the weight and race of the
child and available life-sustaining techniques. Further, the court pointed out
that denial of claims for injuries to the previable fetus often prevents
meritorious claims because "there is substantial medical authority that
congenital structural defects caused by factors in the prenatal environment
94
can be sustained only early in the previable stages."
realize these uncertainties and the viability test is being abandoned. Now complaints
are being sustained where the pleaded facts show that the child was not or might not
have been, viable when the injury occurred.
41 111. App. 2d at 248-49, 190 N.E.2d at 852-53.
88. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 366, 157 A.2d 497, 505 (1960); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401
Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960). Sinkler, relying on Smith, held:
As for the notion that the child must have been viable when the injuries were received,
which has claimed the attention of several of the states, we regard it as having little to
do with the basic right to recover, when the foetus is regarded as having existence as a
separate creature from the moment of conception.
401 Pa. at 273, 164 A.2d at 96.
89. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960).
90. LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 6, § 37.31.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 352, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1252 (1977) (quoting PROSSER, supra note 36, at §
55). In its discussion of viability, the court also cited Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 366, 157
A.2d 497, 504 (1960); A Time for Change, supra note 23, at 213-14; Note, The Impact of
Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to PrenatalInjuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554, 563
(1962).
94. 67 11. 2d at 353, 367 N.E.2d at 1252-53. In fact, it is an established medical proposition
that the crucial period of intrauterine development is the first trimester, long before viability.
During this time the fetus is most susceptible to environmental influences. Note, The Impact of
Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to PrenatalInjuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 154, 563
(1962).
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After noting the difficulties in devising a competent viability test and
recalling that the appellate court in Illinois in two decisions9 5 had rejected
the viability requirement, the Illinois Supreme Court in Renslow renounced
viability as a requirement in common law actions for prenatal injuries. The
analysis, however, did not end there. Still to be decided by the court was the
primary and most troublesome issue of whether an action exists on behalf of
an infant born alive for injuries resulting from a negligent act occurring prior
to conception. At this point, the court turned to an analysis of duty and
foreseeability.
Duty: Not a Static Concept
Fundamentally, a negligence action requires the existence or imposition of a duty owed to the plaintiff, breach of that duty and injury proximately caused thereby. 96 The term "duty" is so nebulous and its boundaries
so indistinct that one commentator has observed that "[t]here is a duty if the
court says there is a duty." 97 The court's pronouncement is often a mirror of
the policy and social requirements of the time and community. 9 8 The duty
required is that the actor conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct
in the light of the apparent risk. 99 This standard of conduct is determined by
balancing the risk and the probability and extent of the harm against the
value of the interest which the actor is seeking to protect and the expedience
of the course pursued. For this reason, negligence is "relative to the need
and the occasion" 100 and is rarely reducible to precise rules.
There are two commonly recognized classes of duties. A duty may be
owed to a particular person because of an existing relationship between the
parties or because that person is a member of a general class to which a duty
is owed. The former has been defined as "an obligation, to which the law
will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of
conduct toward another." 10 1 At issue is whether the defendant is under any
obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff. °0 As to the latter:
[I]n all cases in which any person undertakes the performance of
95. Sana v. Brown, 35 111. App. 2d 425,183 N.E.2d 187(1962); Daley v. Meier, 33 Il1. App.
2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961). The viability requirement has not, however, been abandoned
where the injury inflicted upon a previable fetus results in a stillbirth. In that situation, an action
for wrongful death will not lie. Rapp v. Hiemenz, 107 III. App. 2d 382, 246 N.E.2d 77 (1969).
96. Cunis v. Brennan, 56 IIl. 2d 372, 374, 308 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1974). In Illinois, the
plaintiff must also allege and prove freedom from contributory negligence. Costello v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 40 Ill. App. 3d 461, 352 N.E.2d 417 (1976).
97. Prosser, PaisgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953).
98. Id.
99. PROSSER, supra note 36, at § 53.
100. Id. at § 31.
101. Id. at § 53.
102. Id. Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ili. 2d 372, 374, 308 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1974).
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an act, which if not done with care and skill, will be highly
dangerous to the persons or lives of one or more persons, known
or unknown, the law, ipso facto, imposes, as a public duty the
obligation to exercise such care and skill. 0 3
Duty is not limited to persons who have relied on the defendant's conduct.
Instead, it extends to persons who the defendant could reasonably have
anticipated would be endangered by the negligent conduct.'°

Foreseeability of harm as to the person in fact injured is one limitation
of the scope of duty in a negligence action. 10 5 This limitation requires that
the plaintiff bring himself within the class of persons threatened by the
defendant's conduct before the conduct complained of will be termed
negligent. 106 The leading example of this principle is found in Palsgrafv.
Long IslandR. Co. 107 In Palsgraf, Judge Cardozo, speaking for a majority

of four, refused to impose liability on the defendant. Negligence, he said, is
103. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 77, 199 N.E.2d 769, 775 (1964)
(quoting Van Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co., 52 N.J.L. 240, 247, 19 A. 472, 475
(1890)).
104. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 77, 199 N.E.2d 769, 775'(1964).
105. PROSSER, supra note 36, at § 43; Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E.
99, 229 N.Y.S. 339 (1928). Foreseeability of harm as to the person in fact injured is to be
distinguished from foreseeability that an injury might result from the negligent act complained
of. The latter is an essential prerequisite to the requirement of proximate cause. Ney v. Yellow
Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 79, 117 N.E.2d 74, 78-79 (1954). Proximate cause, however, is not in issue
here.
The principle of limiting liability to foreseeable risk is a subject of considerable controversy. Though it may not be a totally reliable method of limiting the scope of duty, the foreseeability formula is a necessary corollary to the concept of negligence. It has been defended as a
means to a just result because the damages incurred are consistent with fault. Prosser, Palsgraf
Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1953). In other words, the defendant's loss is proportionate
to his liability; thus, he must bear only the loss which he could have foreseen. As stated by one
author:

[i]f we are basing liability upon a negligent act, and if negligence consists in a failure to
foresee results which ought reasonably to have been foreseen, it would seem that the
negligent person ought only to be made liable to the extent to which he ought to have
foreseen those results.
James, supra note 63, at 785 (quoting 8 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 449, 463
(2d ed. 1937)).
The foreseeability principle has been criticized on the basis of fault. Prosser, Paisgraf
Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1953). In a negligence situation, the plaintiff has been injured
and either the innocent plaintiff or the defendant admittedly at fault must shoulder the loss. The
plaintiff should not have to bear the loss because of the defendant's negligence. Id.
The concept of foreseeability has also been promoted on the grounds that it adds certainty
and predictability to the law of negligence by setting boundaries and defining the consequences
for which the defendant will be liable. Id. This argument has been condemned on the basis that
the principle offers neither certainty nor convenience but rather an "illusion of certainty." Id.
at 19.
106. James, supra note 63, at 781.
107. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 229 N.Y.S. 339 (1928). In Palsgraf, a passenger was
running to catch one of the defendant's trains. An employee of the defendant was assisting the
passenger in boarding the train and in so doing, dislodged a package from the passenger's arms.
The package contained fireworks which exploded. The explosion overturned some scales a
distance away which fell on the plaintiff who was standing on the station platform. Nothing
about the package indicated that it contained explosives. The only negligence complained of
was the action of the employee in assisting the passenger.
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a relationship or duty between the parties founded on foreseeability of harm
to the particular plaintiff injured. You cannot have "negligence in the air, so
to speak

..

."108

Judge Cardozo further stated that the conduct of

defendant's employees
if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a
wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relative to
her it was not negligence at all. Nothing in the situation gave
notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril to
persons thus removed.

.

.

.If no hazard was apparent to the eye

of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at least to
outward seeming, with reference to her, did not take to itself the
quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong . . .with
reference to someone else. . . .What the plaintiff must show is a

"wrong" to herself.109
In other words, plaintiff cannot be "the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of
duty to another,11"' but must sue in his own right. Under the Palsgrafrule,
the inquiry into foreseeability is not limited to the physical range of foreseeable harm or to mere proximity in time or space," nor is it restricted to
situations where the defendant had knowledge as to exactly how the accident
would occur.1 2 Rather, it is concerned with the natural forces and human
conduct that were likely to intervene and the consequences likely to result in
view of these interventions. 1 3 In all likelihood, if the defendant's employees in Palsgrafhad known or had reason to know that the package contained
fireworks, their negligence would have encompassed all people within the
probable area of the explosion, including the plaintiff." 4
The Cardozo theory of foreseeability was adopted in Illinois in the
1974 case of Cunis v. Brennan. 115 There, in discussing the factors that
condition the imposition of a duty in a negligence action, the court said,
"the occurrence involved must not have been simply foreseeable . . .it
must have been reasonably foreseeable."" ' 6 The key to the question of
108. Id. at 341, 162 N.E. at 99-100, 229 N.Y.S. at 341 (quoting F. POLLACK, TORTS 455 (11th
ed. 1920)). Three judges dissented in the Palsgraf case. Judge Andrews expressed their view
that negligence does not depend upon a relation between the plaintiff and defendant. Rather,
there is a duty toward the world at large not to be negligent to any person. 248 N.Y. at 350, 162
N.E. at 103, 229 N.Y.S. at 350 (Andrews, Crane & O'Brien, J.J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 341, 344, 162 N.E. at 99-100, 229 N.Y.S. at 341, 344.
110. Id. at 342, 162 N.E. at 100, 229 N.Y.S. at 342.
111. James, supra note 63, at 782.
112. 248 N.Y. at 344, 162 N.E. at 100, 229 N.Y.S. at 344.
113. James, supra note 63, at 782.
.14. 248 N.Y. at 345, 162 N.E. at 101, 229 N.Y.S. at 344.
115. 56 III. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974). Renslow noted that Cunis questioned whether
duty was limited by the scope of foreseeability. Cunis held that no duty arises unless harm is
reasonably foreseeable. See note 116 infra. Presented to the Renslow court was a different
issue: Are there areas of foreseeable harm where no duty arises?
116. 56 Ill. 2d at 375-76, 308 N.E.2d at 619. The court noted "[tihe creation of a legal duty
requires more than a mere possibility of occurrence." Id. at 376, 308 N.E.2d at 619.
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reasonableness is what the reasonably prudent person would have foreseen
17
was likely to happen at the time of the conduct."
The Renslow court disagreed with the defendants' assertion that they
owed no duty to the plaintiff because her injuries had not been reasonably
foreseeable. Unlike Palsgraf,where "[n]othing in the situation gave notice
that the falling package had in it the potency of peril to persons thus
removed," I"8 the injuries to Leah Ann Renslow were medically predictable.
Medical authorities since the 1940's have recognized the effects of the Rhnegative and Rh-positive factors upon hemolytic disease." 9 They have long
known that sensitization occurs in 90% of Rh-negative women who have
received multiple transfusions of Rh-positive blood and that about 85% of
white Americans and a higher percentage of blacks and Chinese Americans
are Rh-positive. 120 Similarly, it is common knowledge that the Rh-positive
fetus of the Rh-negative woman previously sensitized is "at high risk."121
Rh-positive blood should never be transfused to a Rh-negative female who
is under the age of menopause. For these reasons, routine Rh-typing has
been established practice since at least 1961.122 Thus, unlike the facts of
Cunis v. Brennan,123 where the circumstances were "tragically bizarre and
may be unique,"' 124 the injuries to Leah Ann Renslow were not extraordinary.
Mr. Justice Dooley, concurring in Renslow, agreed that it was foreseeable that this thirteen-year-old girl would grow up, marry and become
pregnant. The defendant hospital and doctor, who were held to the standard
of knowledge of experts, "were chargeable with the knowledge of what she
117. Id.
118. 248 N.Y. 334, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 229 N.Y.S. 339, 341 (1928).
119. N. EASTMAN, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 1073-74 (12th ed. 1961) (cited in Renslow v.
Mennonite Hosp., 67 111.2d 348, 353, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1977)).
120. W. NELSON, TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS 1034 (8th ed. 1964) and N. EASTMAN, WILLIAMS
OBSTETRICS 1074, 1076, 1078 (12th ed. 1961) (cited in Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d
348, 353, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1977)).
121. S. ROBBINS, PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE 557 (1974) (cited in Renslow v. Mennonite
Hosp., 67 111.2d 348, 353, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1977)).
122. That the routine identification of Rh types in blood of donors and recipients is
necessary to avoid transfusion hazards is substantiated throughout medical literature. The
practice of transfusing Rh positive blood into Rh negative recipients is unacceptable in women
of child-bearing age because stimulation of the Rh antibody in a mother could cause hemolytic
disease in her Rh positive children. 3 LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 6, at § 24.31
(Rev. 1970).
123. 56 III. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974). In Cunis, as a result of a collision between two
automobiles at an intersection, plaintiff was thrown thirty feet to a parkway where one of his
legs was impaled on a protruding drain pipe. The court held that there was no duty on the part of
the defendant village to make the pipe safe for the plaintiff because the remote possibility of the
occurrence did not give rise to a legal duty.
124. Id. at 377, 308 N.E.2d at 620.
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and her child would encounter as a result of the wrongful transfusion of
blood. -125
Although the majority imposed a duty on the defendants, they did not
base their decision solely on the fact that the risk of injury to Leah Ann
Renslow was foreseeable. 12 6 The court recognized that there are many
interests to which the law has not extended protection from injury even
where such injury may be readily foreseen. This reflects the desire of the
courts to limit liability for negligence in certain instances. In such situations,
there is no need to consider foreseeability; the courts halt their inquiry
before they reach this issue. One area in which duty had until quite recently
been limited, notwithstanding the fact that the injuries might have been
foreseeable, was that of prenatal injury recovery. Thus, though the harm to
the plaintiff in Renslow was foreseeable, the plaintiff at the time of the act
was by no means one to whom a duty traditionally would be owed.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, refused to be limited by the idea
127
of a "traditional duty," emphasizing that duty is not a "static concept."
It pointed out that the notion of duty has progressed, expanded and changed
throughout the law of negligence. A prime example, observed the court, is
the law of prenatal injuries which evolved from two generations of refusal to
recognize a duty owed to an unborn child to readily finding a duty in most
instances today. Further, the court noted that it has long been recognized by
Illinois courts that a duty may exist to one who is unknown and remote in
1 28
time and place.
The recognition that duty fluctuates with changing social conditions
and changing human relations gave the Renslow court the flexibility it
needed to find a duty to this plaintiff. In holding that there exists a right to be
born free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to a
child's mother, the court stated: "We therefore find it illogical to bar relief
for an act done prior to conception where the defendant would be liable for
this same conduct had the child, unbeknownst to him, been conceived prior
125. 67 11. 2d at 365, 367 N.E.2d at 1258.
126. Id. at 354, 367 N.E.2d at 1253. The court used Dean Leon Green's observations which
were quoted with approval in Cunis v. Brennan:
However valuable the foreseeability formula may be in aiding a jury or judge to
reach a decision on the negligence issue, it is altogether inadequate for use by the
judge as a basis of determining the duty issue and its scope. The duty issue, being one
of law, is broad in its implication: the negligence issue is confined to the particular case
and has no implications for other cases. There are many factors other than forseeability that may condition a judge's imposing or not imposing a duty in the particular case.
56 II1. 2d 372, 375, 308 N.E.2d 617,618-19 (quoting Green, Foreseeabilityin Negligence Law, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1417-18 (1%1)).
127. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 III. 2d 348, 356-57, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (1977).
128. Wintersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodenware Co., 361 I11.95, 197 N.E. 578
(1935).
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to his act." 12 9 In essence, the court found a "conditional prospective
130
liability in tort to one not yet in being.'
Causation:Infinite Liability
A controversial aspect of the Renslow decision was whether it was
bottomed solely on the element of causation. Mr. Justice Moran, writing for
the majority, expressly denied this, stating that policy lines must be drawn
somewhere to narrow the scope of actionable causation. He criticized
causation as the sole determinant of liability, saying:
[c]ausation cannot be the answer; in a very real sense the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and back to the beginning
of the world. Any attempt to impose responsibility on such a basis
would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, which would
''set society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation.' "1 3'
The court refused to discard the traditional duty limitation in favor of a
causation formula. Rather, it reaffirmed the concept of duty as a method by
which to direct and control the common law.
Although Mr. Justice Moran made it clear that the decision was
premised on duty rather than causation as the determinant of liability, Mr.
Justice Ryan dissented. He feared that although the majority opinion
couched its decision in terms of duty and foreseeability, as a practical matter
it had focused wholly upon the element of causation and "abandoned the
traditional fault concept of liability premised upon duty and foreseeability."132 He noted that tort law in recent years had changed its focus from
fault to causation because of sympathy for individuals who, through no fault
of their own, suffer damages. The legal concepts of duty and foreseeability,
he said, had become mere fictional avenues by which the courts could reach
desired ends. With this decision, Justice Ryan said, the court had carried the
movement toward "exalting" the causation element one step too far, resulting in the imposition of an intolerable burden on the public in the form of
33
insurance premiums. 1
Further, Justice Ryan was concerned that the majority decision abrogated the touchstone of the law of negligence: foreseeability. Under the
circumstances of Renslow, there was indeed a possibility that the injury
complained of would result from the acts of the defendant but, Justice Ryan
129. 67 Il. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. The court further held that the liability announced
in Renslow would be given prospective application. Id. at 359, 367 N.E.2d at 1256.
130. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884); accord, Wittenberg
& Closen, Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital: "A ContingentProspective Duty to a Child Not Yet
Conceived", 66 ILL. B.J. 149, 155 (1977).
131. 67 II1. 2d at 356, 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
132. Id. at 372, 367 N.E.2d at 1262 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Ryan appears to be
referring to causation in fact, as opposed to proximate causation.
133. Id. at 377-79, 367 N.E.2d at 1265.
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suggested, more is required for the imposition of a legal duty than a mere
possibility of occurrence. The court has, by finding a duty of care owed to a
nonexistent entity, noted Justice Ryan, reached the conclusion that where
there is causation, all results are foreseeable. Neither causation nor foreseeability, without more, is a satisfactory foundation upon which to predicate
liability, he concluded.
As Justice Ryan suggested, the law cannot hold one perpetually responsible for the remote consequences of a single act. Liability standards must
exist and policy standards, e.g., policy limitations provisions, must be
enforced with uniformity. Justice Ryan is also correct in noting the obvious:
causation alone provides no limitation of liability because the chain of
events "causing" a single result can be endless. 13 4 But Renslow did not
establish causation as the liability requirement in the case. Nor did the case
vitiate the long established criteria for pleading a negligence action in
Illinois. The Renslow majority affirmed the necessity of pleading and
subsequently proving a duty, its breach, causation and proximately resulting
damages. Furthermore, to embrace the substance of the Ryan dissent, one
must ignore the fact that this case went to the Supreme Court on review of an
order dismissing the complaint. There was no evidence; nor was there a
trial. Therefore, the "factual questions" attendant to proof of causation
were not before the court, and thus, could not have been decided by this
opinion. The case was decided, and properly so, on the legal issue of duty
rather than the factual issue of causation.
RENSLOW: ITS IMPLICATIONS

Renslow may be looked upon with disfavor by critics as being a
considerable extension of existing authority. To the contrary, Renslow is a
natural development of prenatal injury law. The idea that a duty may exist to
one foreseeably harmed though he be remote in time and space is not new to
Illinois courts.1 35 The cases allowing relief to infants for injuries incurred in
their previable states themselves reflect the willingness of the courts to
extend a duty to persons whose existence was not apparent at the time of the
act.
Not only is Renslow a natural development of prenatal injury law, but
134. See Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24 (1953).
135. Wintersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodenware Co., 361 III. 95, 197 N.E. 578
(1935). In Wintersteen, the defendant loaded a railway boxcar with barrels and shipped them to
plaintiff's employer. Plaintiff was injured when a barrel fell out of the car upon him. Defendant
argued that he owed no duty of care to plaintiff inasmuch as there was no contract between
plaintiff and defendant. The court held that the "duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury
to another does not depend upon contract, privity of interest or the proximity of relationship
between the parties. It extends to remote and unknown persons." Id. at 103, 197 N.E. at 582.
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it is illustrative of the flexibility of the common law. Change and development alter social ideas and the common law, in order to remain effective
in today's jurisprudence, must keep abreast of these changes and deal with
the current problems of society. It is the function of the courts to keep the
common law in touch with life by constantly re-evaluating and actively
updating it.
Numerous arguments have been advanced and accepted by the courts to
support the theory that an action should lie to recover damages for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries. It has been said that: (1) natural justice
demands recognition of a legal right of a child to start life unimpaired by
defects resulting from injuries caused by the negligence of another;' 36 (2) no
wrong should go without redress;137 and (3) because the law recognizes the
separate existence of an unborn child for purposes of providing protection in
the descent and devolution of property, the law should recognize its separate
existence for purposes of redressing tortious conduct. 13 8 By analogy, the law
should apply such arguments to permit recovery for pre-conception injuries
as well.
There is clearly a paradox inherent in a system of liability which allows
a child to recover for injuries sustained subsequent to his conception but not
for injuries sustained prior to his conception. Certainly the child is no less
injured in the latter situation than in the former. The child in either case is
born with a disability resulting from another's negligence and should be
given the same opportunity for redress. There is no valid justification for
penalizing a child who, through no fault of his or her own, was born with a
disability resulting from pre-conception negligent conduct. This theory
comports with the notion that there exists throughout all stages of development prior to birth an interest in potential life that should be protected by
the courts. A tortfeasor should not be absolved of liability for his negligent
act simply by the fortuitous fact that his conduct occurred prior to the
plaintiff's conception.
A recognition of liability under these circumstances is in keeping with
the traditional philosophy underlying tort law that for every wrong there
should be a remedy. 139 In the eighteenth century, Blackstone observed:
136. Radiation and Preconception Injuries, supra note 7, at 432; 62 AM. JUR. 2d Prenatal
Injuries § 4 (1972).
137. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240-41, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730-31, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34,
36-37 (1961); 62 AM. JUR. 2d PrenatalInjuries § 4 (1972).
138. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497, 502 (1960); PROSSER, supra note 36, at
§ 55; 62 AM. JUR. 2d PrenatalInjuries § 4 (1972).
139. Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976). "It is fundamental to our
" Id. at 230,
common law system that one may seek redress for every substantial wrong ....
387 N.Y.S.2d at 210 (quoting Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34, 36 (1961)).
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"For wherever the common law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it also
gives a remedy by action; and, therefore, wherever a new injury is done, a
new method of remedy must be pursued." 1" That principle was contemporarily restated in Wintersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodenware
Co.,141 when the court said that "the law is presumed to furnish a remedy
for the redress of every wrong." 142 Although the dissenting opinions in
Renslow intimate that to allow an action for pre-conception injuries is to
penetrate "outer space in the world of law,"1 43 the court has, in expanding
the duty owed in prenatal cases to pre-conception negligent conduct, carried
the reasoning of Blackstone to a logical conclusion.
This is not to say that Renslow will not, as do all precedent-setting
cases, generate a variety of troublesome questions for the practitioner, the
courts and the legislature. As emphasized by the dissenters, it can be argued
that Renslow has changed the concept of "duty" in Illinois tort law. It is
arguable that the decision bypasses the rule that for one to maintain a suit for
personal injuries, the negligent conduct must be directed either to the person
of the suer, a relative, or one upon whom he is dependent. Prior to the
appellate court opinion of June 10, 1976, it had been seemingly unquestioned in Illinois that a "person" claiming injury must have been, at the
very least, conceived at the time of injury. t44 The only Illinois case to
consider an analogous situation, i.e., a non-physical tort committed upon a
plaintiff simultaneously with conception, was Zepeda v. Zepeda, t 45 where
the court, although suggesting in dictum that a child could be injured before
or at the time it was conceived, concluded that the ramifications of extending a cause of action for wrongful life to a plaintiff not a being in existence
were too far-reaching. The court refused to allow the action and suggested
new legislation as a remedy.
140. 3 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES* 123 (quoted in Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67
Ill. 2d 348, 360, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1256 (1977) (Dooley, J., concurring)).
141. 361 I11. 95, 197 N.E. 578 (1935).
142. Id. at 103, 197 N.E. at 582.
143. 67 I11.2d at 360, 367 N.E.2d at 1256 (Dooley, J., concurring).
144. Brief for Appellant at 5, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 111. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250
(1977); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Il. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Rodriquez v. Patti,
415 III. 496, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953); Amann v. Faidy, 415 I11.422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Rapp v.
Hiemenz, 107 111.App. 2d 382, 246 N.E.2d 77 (1969); Sana v. Brown, 35 Ill. App. 2d 425, 183
N.E.2d 187 (1962); Daley v. Meier, 33 II1. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961). In Rapp the
second district appellate court denied recovery for the death of a stillborn child because there
was no evidence that the child was viable at the time of injury. This decision reinforced the
notion that there must be a person, either in being or capable of being at the time of injury. Brief
for Appellant at 6, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 I11.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
145. 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). Zepeda
did not involve physical injury to the plaintiff. Rather,*Zepeda was an action for damages by the
defendant's illegitimate son in which the child claimed he was injured in his person, property,
and reputation by the defendant's causing him to be born a bastard.
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As have Illinois courts, other jurisdictions have traditionally recognized that "the defendant could owe no duty of conduct to a person who was
not in existence at the time of his action.' ' 4 6 Duty is viewed as a relation
between parties, a concept founded on foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff
in fact injured. 147 In Renslow, the plaintiff alleged that a transfusion permanently injured her mother by sensitizing the latter's blood. Thus, the person
"in fact injured" was the plaintiff's mother in the first instance. It was only
through the injury to her mother that the plaintiff sustained injury. 148 It can
be argued that creating a duty to a being not in existence at the time of injury
is a classic illustration of the "negligence in the air" 149 condemned by Judge
Cardozo in Palsgraf.
Another troublesome issue addressed by the dissenters is that Renslow
could, in effect, impose interminable prospective liability upon physicians
in that they could be subject to claims literally decades after a negligent
act. 150 It is not beyond the realm of possibility that an action could be
maintained by successive individuals in the chain of heredity or transmitted
genetically as a result of a nuclear accident, exposure to radiation or use of
drugs. '5 1 It can be argued that this runs contrary to the traditional desire of
the judiciary to encourage complete discovery, litigation of issues while the
facts are still discoverable and expeditious termination of litigation. 5 2 It
further frustrates the primary purpose of the Limitations Act. 15 3 That act was
designed to further justice by terminating the uncertainty of claims and
foreclosing unlimited liability.1 In construing the Limitations Act, the
judiciary has, in the past, carved out exceptions and applied it to situations
which it was not designed to encompass. At some point, it may be argued, a
line must be drawn. Exceptions to the statute must be limited and justified so
as not to pervert its intentions. Renslow, it might be said, opens doors to
further extensions of the Limitations Act.
146. PROSSER, supra note 36, at § 55.
147. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 341,162 N.E. 99, 101,229 N.Y.S. 339, 345
(1928).
148. Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 111. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d
1250 (1977).
149. Id. at 10.
150. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 371-72, 376-77, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1261,
1262, 1264 (1977) (Ryan, Underwood & Ward, JJ., dissenting).
151. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 11. App. 2d 240, 250-51, 190 N.E.2d 849, 853-54 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). The Illinois Appellate court in Zepeda speculated about thermonuclear radiation which affects the reproductive cells of future parents so their offspring
may be born with physical and mental defects. See also Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d
348, 377, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1264 (1977) (Ryan, J., dissenting); Radiation and Preconception
Injuries, supra note 7.
152. Brief for Appellant at 15, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 I11. 2d 348,367 N.E.2d 1250
(1977).
153. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 83, § 15 (1975).
154. Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Renslow does not, however, stand for the proposition that every person
who suffers injury as a result of pre-conception negligent conduct will be
entitled to recovery. To the contrary, if the concept of duty was, in fact,
modified by the supreme court in Renslow, the modification correlated
directly to the facts of the case. It must be remembered that cases are
decided on the basis of the facts peculiar to them. Renslow is no exception.
The court must, in each case, consider "[t]he likelihood of injury, the
magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and the consequences of
placing that burden on the defendant." 5 5 In Renslow, the medical probability was great that the transfusion of Rh-negative blood into the Rh-positive
blood of a woman of childbearing age could cause hemolytic disease in her
children. The magnitude of the burden imposed on the defendants to guard
against injuries such as these must be considered in light of the fact that the
defendants are in the medical profession.' 56 Emma Renslow, on the other
hand, was unaware that she was given the wrong type of blood and had no
knowledge of the potential dangers to her later born children as a result
thereof. To require that physicians guard against transfusing their patients
with mistyped blood is not only "a reasonable burden but encourages
responsible medical treatment and advisement." ' 157 Imposing such a "burden" is unarguably in the public interest. The unique factual situation in
Renslow justifies the conclusion reached by the court and vitiates any
argument that the decision creates open-ended liability for every tortfeasor
who injures someone who later gives birth to a child. 158
One concern expressed by Justice Ryan, dissenting in Renslow, was
that the expansion of tort law by the majority effectively imposed a strain on
the public.' 59 He argued that the notion of "spreading the risk" among the
public has', in recent years, expanded to accommodate more and more
individuals. Mr. Justice Ryan noted that juries sympathetic to unfortunate
plaintiffs have increased the size of verdicts. As a result, the price of
spreading the loss has been inflated to such outlandish proportions that the
155. Lance v. Senior, 36 Ill. 2d 516, 518, 224 N.E.2d 231, 233 (1967).
156. Brief for Appellee at 19, Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 I!1.
2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250
(1977).
157. Id.
158. For example, assume a twelve-year-old female suffers a fractured pelvis and abdominal and spinal injuries in an automobile collision between herself and the defendant, who is a
truck driver with a fifth grade education. At twenty-five years of age, she gives birth to a child
who is born with cerebral palsy caused by a troublesome delivery resulting from her deformed
pelvis. Further, assume perfect liability as to the defendant and none as to the female. Can the
mother or the child bring an action against the tortfeasor? This situation appears to be beyond
the scope of Renslow. Clearly, the defendant truck driver has no responsibility to warn the
mother to be cautious about later pregnancies. Renslow, on the other hand, presents perfect
circumstances under which to impose liability on technicians to exercise reasonable care within
their area of expertise.
159. 67 I11.
2d at 373, 367 N.E.2d at 1262 (Ryan, J., dissenting).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

cost to the public is no longer insignificant. Automobile insurance rates have
skyrocketed, health insurance premiums have increased dramatically and
the cost of malpractice insurance has created havoc in the medical world.
The public, said Mr. Justice Ryan, has in various-ways expressed dissatisfaction with the burden placed upon them. They have been searching for
alternatives to circumvent this by advocating no-fault insurance and other
legislation designed to limit or modify recovery. Nevertheless, the courts
have continued to expand the areas of recovery. Rather, said Mr. Justice
Ryan, they must establish boundaries and limits to liability in accordance
with the fault concept of tort recovery.
It is beyond question, as Mr. Justice Ryan intimates, that the law must
weigh the interest for which the plaintiff demands protection with the
interest of the public. But, in balancing the two interests, a court must
consider the circumstances peculiar to the case before it. The issues addressed by Mr. Justice Ryan were not before the court. Rather, as Mr.
Justice Dooley, in his concurring opinion pointed out, Mr. Justice Ryan
"uses this case as a vehicle to complain of'' 6° our present system of tort
law.
Of further concern to legal theorists has been the difficulty of proving a
causal connection between negligence and damage in prenatal injury
cases. 16 1 According to one authority, medical testimony and medical proof
of causes may be less than reliable in pre-conception cases. 162 However, the
difficulty of establishing causation is not an appropriate or valid basis for
denying relief. Causation and damages present evidentiary issues which
should not be confused with the right to bring an action. The plaintiff has the
burden of pleading and proving the causal connection between the negligent
act and the resulting injuries. Therefore, rather than acting as a bar to the
initiation of the suit, the element of causation should foreclose or mitigate
163
recovery if too speculative.
This is not to say that the difficulty of establishing proof in preconception cases is not indeed good reason for exercising caution in allowing recovery. However, as far as causation is concerned, surely there will be
cases in which the difficulties of proof are no more frequent and no greater
than that presented by other medical problems. 11 The difficulties of proof of
causal connection are not peculiar to the field of pre-conception torts. 165 The
mere difficulty of proving a fact is certainly not good reason for disallowing
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 370, 367 N.E.2d at 1261 (Dooley, J., concurring).
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); PROSSER, supra note 36, at § 55.
Radiation and Preconception Injuries, supra note 7, at 431.
PROSSER, supra note 36, at § 55.
21 VILL. L. REV. 994, 1000 (1975-1976).
PROSSER, supra note 36, at § 55.
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a cause of action. It seems logical that the courts should "follow scientific
discoveries one step further and hold that so long as causation can be
proved, compensation should be allowed." 1" If the causal connection can
be proved, "the law cannot afford to deny recovery for pre-conception
injuries if a child is born and lives with a handicap created by defendant's
[negligence] under such circumstances that he would be liable if conception
'1 67
had already taken place."
CONCLUSIONS

The body of law dealing with prenatal injuries is continually restructuring itself to keep pace with medical science and changing notions of legal
duty. It has, over its brief lifespan, run the gamut from recognizing a duty
only to viable fetuses to recognizing that an infant has a legal existence
during its entire prenatal life to recognizing, in Renslow, a prospective duty
to a child not yet conceived at the time of the negligent act. While the longrange effects of the extension of duty in Renslow to one not in being at the
time of the negligent act remain to be seen, the judiciary will, in all
likelihood, as noted by the majority in Renslow, draw distinctions on a caseby-case basis between those harms which should be recompensed and those
which should not.
JENNIFER ANNE MIDLOCK
166. Radiation and Preconception Injuries, supra note 7, at 432.
167. Id.

